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The author discusses the relationship between two legal orders: international law and 
European Union (EU) law. The main provisions of this relationship have been established 
through the precedential practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union – the 
EU’s main judicial body.
This kind of research seems important because of the gap in the theory of international 
law caused by the immutable dogma of the supremacy of international law. However, 
modern legal practice demonstrates a certain fragmentation of the international legal 
order because of the impact of the existence and development of regional supranational 
legal orders. The EU legal order, with its own special nature (sui generis), is undoubtedly 
one of the most developed among them.
The Court of Justice of the European Union performs a crucial role in the EU legal system 
concerning application and interpretation of EU law. It provides a uniform interpretation 
of this law for the purposes of development of supranational integration. In this context 
the Court of Justice the European Union establishes the status of European law and its 
relationship with the national legal systems and international law. The Court acts as 
protector of the EU legal order against the influence of other legal orders.
The Court’s precedential practice reveals EU law’s tendency towards its constitu-
tionalization and the development of its autonomy. The latest practice indicates the 
Court’s powers to review the EU institutions’ acts in relation to the implementation of UN 
Security Council resolutions. This proves the Court’s ability to establish indirect control 
even over UN acts.
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Introduction
the current status of european union (hereinafter – eu) law theory confirms that 
the issues of the relationship between the eu legal order and the international legal 
order, as well as the issues of the Court of Justice of the european union (hereinafter – 
CJeu, Court) practice concerning this problem, are clearly undervalued and have not 
been researched yet because of the immutable dogma concerning the supremacy 
of international law.
Fragmentation has recently become a clear and ever stronger tendency within 
current international law. this was especially evident with the emergence and further 
development of a powerful new entity, the eu, which has established its own legal 
system dissimilar to both the international legal order and the national legal order. the 
CJeu has had a significant role in the development of eu law’s autonomous status. it 
is the CJeu that occupies the central position in the application and interpretation of 
eu law. the Court provides a uniform interpretation of this law to promote integration. 
the CJeu established the status of eu law and its relationship with national and 
international law. in this respect, there arises an urgent need to analyze the new stage 
of the eu court practice development concerning these issues. systematization of the 
CJeu practice enables to analyze the basic trends in relations between multiple levels 
of legal orders, although it is too early to expect a solution to all problem areas.
1. Constitutionalization of EU Law
the first CJeu judgment that defined the status of the Communities’ new 
legal system was the decision in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen1 (hereinafter – van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands), which declared:
the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields and the subjects of which comprise not only member states 
but also their nationals.
this decision became fundamental in the subsequent practice of the Court. it 
should be noted that though the Court defined the law of the Community as a new 
type of legal order, but nevertheless – as a part of international legal order. At that 
stage of development of the integration the Court paid attention to the separation 
of the european legal order from legal orders of the members states and to the 
establishment of its absolute supremacy, while not emphasizing its autonomy from 
the international legal order.
1  Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] e.C.r. 1.
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Later on, with the speed of integration increasing, the Court began developing 
the concept of this legal order increasing autonomy from international law, it 
developed its sui generis nature. As early as 1964, in its decision in Costa v. E.N.E.L.,2 
the Court stated:
As opposed to other international treaties, the treaty instituting the e.e.C. 
has created its own order which was integrated with the national order of the 
member-states the moment the treaty came into force; as such, it is binding 
upon them.
thus, CJeu practice emphasizes the uniqueness of the nature of the integrational 
law and its difference from both national legal orders and international legal order. 
At the present stage of eu development, the Court notes that eu Founding treaties 
(hereinafter – Founding treaties) constitute a “basic constitutional charter based on 
the rule of law”3 or even an “internal constitution.”4
it is obvious that, with the deepening of the european integration, the Court 
started сonstitutionalizing eu law which is understood as a process in which the 
Founding treaties evolved from a set of arrangements, only binding for the member 
states, to the Founding treaties which provide a basis for a unique legal regime. this 
regime grants rights and assigns duties to all public persons and individuals in on 
the territory of the eu because norms of the Founding treaties have a direct effect 
and absolute supremacy, and they form a peculiar integrational legal system. thus, 
this legal regime acquired the features of a constitution.
when speaking about the CJeu’s influence on the eu legal order, the key thing 
to mention is the development of eu law principles that enabled it to acquire the 
features of a constitution. the said principles also explain the uniqueness of eu law 
and its legal order and its distinctiveness from all other legal systems. these issues 
are extremely important when it comes to dealing with the problem of relations 
between international and eu law.
Alongside the eu legal system, there exist the member states’ national legal 
systems. For this reason, the CJeu formulated and rationalized the principles of 
the supremacy of european Community (hereinafter – Community) law over the 
member states’ national law and approved it as the highest principle that regulates 
the relations between the Community law and the national legal systems. with the 
entering into force of the Lisbon treaty, this principle became applicable to eu law. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that all member states, while drafting the Lisbon 
2  Case 6/64 Flamino Costa v. E.N.E.L., [1964] e.C.r. 585.
3  Case 294/83 Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament, [1986] e.C.r. 1339.
4  opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-Up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, 
[1977] e.C.r. 741.
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treaty, signed declaration 17 on the highest legal validity, where the principle of 
the supremacy of eu law over the laws the member states became entrenched. the 
supremacy principle was embodied in the declaration exactly in the wording that 
had been formulated in CJeu practice. this fact clearly emphasizes the CJeu’s role 
in the development of supranational law.
the principle of the supremacy of Community law was initially absent in the Founding 
treaties and that was a problem because the legal systems of some of member states 
lacked any provision for the supremacy of european or international law and, therefore, 
they could theoretically cancel, for example, some provisions of the Founding treaties 
by adopting a later national act. in response to this threat, in 1964, the Court adopted 
the decision in Costa v. E.N.E.L., already mentioned above, which stated:
the transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the 
Community legal system of their rights and obligations arising under the 
treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against 
which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the 
Community cannot prevail.5
the subsequent CJeu practice resulted in the introduction of fundamental supra-
national law supremacy principle into permanent use by the member states as the 
one based on the nature of the Community law. in the decision in Amministrazione 
delle Finanze v. Simmenthal SpA6 (hereinafter – Simmental), the Court once again, 
but in a bolder manner, established the supremacy of Community law. the decision 
stated:
Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of the precedence of 
Community law, the relationship between provisions of the treaty and directly 
applicable measures of the institutions on the one hand and the national 
law of the Member states on the other is such that those provisions and 
measures not only by their entry into force render automatically inapplicable 
any conflicting provision of current national law but… also preclude the valid 
adoption of new national legislative measures to the extent to which they 
would be incompatible with Community provisions.
the Court established that incompatibility between the national law and the 
Community law has to lead not only to the automatic non-application of the former, 
but should also prevent the adoption of any new national legal norms which do 
not meet the standards of supranational law. such conclusions, undoubtedly, have 
5  Flamino Costa v. E.N.E.L., supra note 2.
6  Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, [1978] e.C.r. 629.
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promoted the efficiency of the entire eu legal system and helped the member states 
fulfill their obligations within the european union.
it is very important that the decision in Simmental established the supremacy of 
integrational law, even over the member states’ constitutions. the CJeu once again 
emphasized that no national legal act can be opposed to the Community law, which 
is autonomous in its nature. the principle of the supremacy of Community law also 
applies to the national constitutions, otherwise the legal basis of integrational law 
and legal order could be called into question. dealing with the Community law, 
the Court did not limit it to the Founding treaties only, but also includes in it the 
secondary law, i.e. institutional acts or agreements with third parties, irrespective 
of when they were signed: before or after the national regulation adoption. For 
example, in 1996, the Belgian Council of state (the supreme Administrative Court 
of Belgium) recognized the supremacy of the Community act over the national 
Constitution. the same occurred in Austria in 1999.
the CJeu practice has developed a norm under which the supremacy of the 
eu law does not mean automatic cancellation of the national norms which do not 
correspond to eu law, such norms just cannot be applied (they are null and void). 
the reason is that the CJeu has no powers to interpret or repeal the member states’ 
national legislation and, consequently, the duty to cancel such norms is assigned to 
the state which adopted them. it is worth mentioning that, despite the fact that it was 
an innovative and unknown principle, all eu member states have now recognized the 
supremacy of Community law. Nowadays it is generally accepted despite attempts 
to protect national autonomy.
the next fundamental tenet developed by the CJeu is the eu law direct effect 
principle that was initially related to the Community law and was then extended 
to eu law. this principle means that this law applies to the entire territory of the eu 
and all its subjects, i.e., member states and eu institutions, and, most importantly, 
it grants rights to individuals and legal entities without any implementation on the 
national level. it is well-known that the direct effect of norms is not inherent in public 
international law because, as was decided by the uN international Court of Justice, 
the parties to international treaties can decide to allocate some of their provisions 
with direct effect,7 but such instances are the exceptions to the rule. in integrational 
european law, this provision became a fundamental principle and demonstrates the 
uniqueness of the eu law system.
the principle of the direct effect of eu law is absent in the Founding treaties 
(Art. 288 of the treaty on the Functioning of the european union (hereinafter – 
tFeu) states that only regulations have a direct effect) and its existence is the CJeu’s 
7  Permanent Court of international Justice. international Court of Justice Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
Compétence des tribunaux de dantzig (réclamations Pécuniaires des Fonctionnaires Ferroviaries 
dantzikois Passés an service Polonais Contre l’Administration Polonaise des Chemins de Fer) [Jurisdiction 
of the Courts of danzig (Pecuniary Claims of danzig railway officials who have Passed into the Polish 
service, against the Polish railways Administration)] (Leyde: société d’éditions A.w. sijthoff, 1928).
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unquestionable achievement. the Court’s first rationalization of the direct effect 
principle was fixed in the decision in van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands:
independently of the legislation of Member states, Community law 
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to 
center upon them rights which come [sic] part of their national heritage.8
the case concerned a direct effect of the Founding treaty provision, but did not 
have any effect on the application of secondary law. the subsequent CJeu practice 
in the 1970s resulted in a broad interpretation of this principle to promote eu law 
efficiency and extended it to the acts of the institutions which had initially not been 
allocated the direct effect status provided they met a number of requirements. 
such requirements provide that: the norm granting the rights shall be obvious 
and unambiguous (i.e. having a precise nature and clear assignment), it shall be 
unconditional and its application shall not depend on the adoption of any other 
eu or member states’ norms. But the Court added that it was necessary to treat the 
precise nature criterion with due care as the need to explain the norm by judicial 
interpretation cannot prevent its direct effect.
therefore, the direct effect principle can be extended not only to the regulations 
and certain provisions of the Founding treaties but, in part, to other eu acts as well. 
As regards the direct effect of directives, the CJeu specified that a directive can have 
a direct effect only if the state did not fulfill the obligation to implement it and only 
after the end of the period established for the implementation of the directive into 
the national legal orders. if a member state neglects the directive implementation 
obligation within the established period, then, according to the CJeu, it is possible 
to refer to a provision of such directive before a domestic court, despite the rules of 
the national law.9 this is another indication of the uniqueness of the eu legal order 
since individuals cannot be deprived of their rights protection mechanisms only 
because the member state did not fulfill its obligation on directive implementation. 
this is the confirmation of the fact that the eu is not a mere association of states, 
but a union of european peoples. it is possible to state with complete confidence 
that the eu legal mechanisms are orientated on individuals and that is not inherent 
to international law and its legal order.
it should be noted that, even with a considerable amount of CJeu judgments 
concerning the direct effect of directives, this issue has caused a set of doctrinal 
discussions, especially regarding the horizontal effect of directives (meaning that 
individuals cannot refer to the provisions of the directive in their relations with other 
individuals, but only concerning their relations with the state, i.e., the direct effect is 
used only in vertical relations because of the directives being oriented towards the 
8  Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands, supra note 1.
9  Case 8/81 Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, [1982] e.C.r. 53.
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states and not towards individuals). there is no doubt that the extension of the direct 
effect principle to the directives is probably an exception as otherwise the obligation of 
the states to carry out the measures to implement the directives would be nullified.
the principle of the direct effect of eu law norms also means that, except when 
granting rights directly to individuals, the eu’s bodies’ acts do not need the member 
states’ parliaments’ approval. these acts can oblige member states to carry out certain 
actions and domestic courts to apply these acts irrespective of any contradictions 
with the national laws. the value of the direct effect principle is that eu law can act 
even when the state has not fulfilled its obligation on eu law implementation, as 
was confirmed in Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v. Italian Republic10 
(hereinafter – Francovich). this principle establishes the most profitable interaction 
between the member states’ national and supranational european law which helps 
to achieve the eu goals.
the principles of eu law supremacy and its direct effect may be viewed as the 
two fundamental pillars of the entire eu legal system. By allotting the supremacy 
and direct effect to eu law, the CJeu in fact began the process of integrational law 
constitutionalization. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that eu law 
constitutionalization enabled the use of its norms – primary or secondary – directly in 
the member states’ national legal orders, as well as by individuals. unprecedentedly 
for the international community, eu law constitutionalization resulted in the domestic 
courts’ effective eu law application (sometimes even in the absence of the relevant 
national norms), and this, in turn, changed the national court practice which started 
adapting itself to eu law basic principles. Moreover, individuals began playing an 
active role in this law implementation within the framework of the national legal 
systems, which is extremely unusual for regular international organizations.
Another important aspect of eu law constitutionalization is the doctrine of 
responsibility for violations of eu law reflected in the Francovich decision.11 this 
doctrine is based on the ubi jus ibi remedium principle according to which the state 
shall pay the damages caused to individuals because of an eu law violation. in such 
cases, domestic courts can rule that the state must pay compensation for harm done 
to individuals as a result of a violation of eu law. this doctrine is an important element 
of the efficiency of the eu legal order since not all of its norms have a direct effect, so 
individuals in domestic courts cannot use all of them for the protection of their rights. 
For example, directives have no direct horizontal effect, therefore, the doctrine of 
responsibility for eu law violation (including the directives provisions) is extremely 
important for providing individuals with effective protection mechanisms.
in the context of constitutionalization of eu law, in a number of its decisions, the 
CJeu formulated three conditions required for responsibility for a violation of eu 




law: 1) eu acts shall grant rights to individuals; 2) the violation of these rights by the 
state shall be rather serious; 3) there shall be a direct link between the losses and 
violation.12 At the same time, what is extremely important is that the responsibility 
falls on the state in case of any eu norm violations, irrespective of whether it is 
a direct action norm or not.
the Court adopted a unitary approach concerning the state-violator, i.e., 
the responsibility is placed on the state irrespective of the branch of power that 
committed the violations. the Court’s interpretation of executive power is broad 
since it includes both the traditional departments of central power and municipal 
authorities, and constitutionally independent bodies to which the obligation to keep 
public order and safety is assigned, etc.13
As regards the second condition (the seriousness of a violation by a member state), 
serious violations include failure to apply an eu act, a delay in its implementation, 
and interpretation of national law contrary to eu law or CJeu case law. the degree 
of seriousness issue has been ascribed to the domestic courts’ discretion, though 
some researchers indicate the need for the CJeu’s centralized control over national 
courts in this sphere. the CJeu has not offered any consolidated provisions in this 
respect, but many such provisions are contained in CJeu practice. For example, if the 
state attempted to implement the act within the terms indicated in it, then this case 
does not meet the seriousness requirement, and the state will not be liable for the 
damages inflicted on the individuals. it happened in The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte 
British Telecommunications plc.,14 which concerned directive 90/351 on the procedure 
for acquisition of the telecommunications sector organization. this directive was 
implemented by great Britain on time, but in the wrong manner. the CJeu came to 
the conclusion that, because the directive’s formulation was not sufficiently clear, its 
interpretation in the process of its implementation could not be regarded as a violation 
serious enough to justify the state’s compensation of British telecommunications.
the compensation shall generally correspond to the loss which was caused by the 
state’s misconduct. in the absence of supranational norms concerning the amount of 
damage compensation by member states, it is necessary to develop precise criteria 
for the determination of those amounts. such criteria shall be as favorable as those 
concerning similar claims based on national norms and shall correspond to the 
principles of equivalence and efficiency.
the CJeu noted that the states’ responsibility doctrine and their obligations to 
compensate losses to individuals for their violations despite the fact that it is not 
mentioned in the Founding treaties, constitute an integral part of them because 
it guarantees the exercise of individuals’ rights. the Court thereby declared the 
functional integrity of the rights and the means of their protection.
12  Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano, [1989] e.C.r. 1839.
13  Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] e.C.r. 1651.
14  Case C-392/93 The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications plc., [1996] e.C.r. i-01631.
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thanks to the developed concepts of eu law supremacy and its direct effect, 
as well as the possibility of holding member states responsible in case of non-
compliance with the integration law (through the CJeu’s centralized procedure or the 
domestic courts’ decentralized system), the process of the eu law constitutionalization 
becomes more effective. the CJeu thereby maintains the main idea of europe, 
a strong union between the peoples which is, in many respects, provided for by 
authority of supranational law.
2. The Position of International Law  
in the Hierarchy of Sources of EU Law
taking into account the development and uniqueness of eu law, there naturally 
arises the issue of its relationship with international law, which, at the current stage 
of the european union’s development, is extremely important.
the Court first expressed its opinion on the position of international law in eu 
law in its judgment in the Haegeman v. Belgium case,15 stating that international 
agreements ratified by Community institutions are part of the Community law (now 
eu law). the CJeu is responsible for a unified interpretation of these agreements and 
the interpretation of eu law in light thereof in order to effectively implement the 
provisions of these international agreements.16
the Founding treaties, in turn, establish that the eu and its institutions facilitate 
the strict observance of international law, including respect for the principles of the 
uN Charter (Arts. 3(5) and 21(1) of the treaty on european union (hereinafter – teu)). 
the CJeu is obliged to comply with international law in its practice and in its control 
over other eu institutions but, formally, none of the Founding treaties’ provisions 
discloses the place that international law occupies in eu law hierarchy.
2.1. International Agreements to Which the EU is a Party
in the context of this research, there is an important problem regarding the 
place international agreements occupy in the hierarchy of sources of eu law. As 
regards the international agreements to which the european union is a party, 
Art. 216(2) of the tFeu includes them in sources of eu law which are binding on 
eu institutions and member states. taking into account the procedure for granting 
consent to such agreements, they are lower than the Founding treaties but higher 
than secondary eu legislation. this is proven by the fact that, in the negotiation 
and conclusion of such international agreements, a member state, the european 
Parliament (hereinafter – Parliament), the european Council (hereinafter – Council) 
or the european Commission (hereinafter – Commission) may obtain the opinion 
15  Case 181/73 R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State, [1974] e.C.r. 00449.
16  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A., [1982] e.C.r. 03641.
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of the Court as to whether an agreement is compatible with the Founding treaties 
(Art. 218(11) of the tFeu). where the opinion of the Court is that it is not compatible, 
the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended or the 
Founding treaties are revised. otherwise it will be considered that the Founding 
treaties have primacy over international agreements entered into by the eu.
it is interesting that the practice of using tFeu Art. 218(11) confirms that eu 
institutions rarely choose the option of amending the Founding treaties, and usually 
make changes to international agreements. this fact also indirectly indicates the 
appropriate hierarchy of these sources of law. in this way the respect to eu law 
basics, the so-called acquis communautaire, is confirmed. this seems logical since 
the Founding treaties have a different, more constitutional character, than typical 
international agreements because the majority of the Founding treaties’ norms 
have a direct effect and concern the rights of individuals. therefore, because of 
their characteristics, they cannot be changed frequently. these differences were 
highlighted by the Court itself in its Opinion on an Agreement between the Community 
and the Countries Forming the European Free Trade Association.17 the Court pointed 
out that the agreement on the european economic Area is a classic international 
agreement that does not involve the transfer of the member states’ sovereign rights 
to intergovernmental bodies. in contrast, the Founding treaties, albeit concluded in 
the form of an international agreement, nonetheless constitutes the constitutional 
charter of the Community based on the rule of law.
there are only a few cases where the Founding treaties were amended because of 
incompatibilities with international agreements. one example is the case of the eu’s 
accession to the world trade organization and to the Convention for the Protection 
of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms (when the tFeu was amended by 
Protocol (No. 8) relating to Art. 6(2) of the teu on the accession to the Convention 
for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms).18
indirectly, Art. 351 of the tFeu also indicates the primacy of the Founding treaties 
over international agreements. it stipulates that, to the extent that such agreements 
are not compatible with the Founding treaties, the member state or states concerned 
shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. this 
provision allows the Court to effectively protect the eu’s legal order from the 
undesirable effects of international law, thereby strengthening its autonomy. Because 
of this, there is no doubt that Art. 351 of the tFeu has constitutional significance.
17  opinion 1/91 delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the treaty – draft 
agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the european Free 
trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the european economic Area, [1991] 
e.C.r. i-06079.
18  opinion 1/94 Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning 
services and the protection of intellectual property – Article 228(6) of the eC treaty, [1994] e.C.r. 
i-05267; opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the european Convention for the Protection 
of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] e.C.r. i-01759.
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it should be noted that, in practice, Art. 351 of the tFeu has not often been used19 but 
the CJeu’s practice set certain trends. this practice shows that, in cases where this article 
applies, the Court is inclined to unquestioningly protect eu law. the doctrine even wit-
nessed the emergence of the view that the CJeu began formulating a new approach to 
the assessment of agreements concluded by member states with third countries.20
if, previously, the Court could recognize an international agreement concluded 
by member states as incompatible with eu law, the new approach shows that it 
can do so even in the case of “hypothetical incompatibility.” examples of this can be 
found in the decisions in Commission v. Republic of Austria,21 Commission v. Kingdom 
of Sweden,22 Commission v. Republic of Finland.23 the cases concerned a large number 
of bilateral investment agreements of Austria, sweden and Finland, which had been 
concluded before their accession to the eu. there were no actual contradictions 
between these agreements and the Founding treaties but, in the Commission’s 
and the CJeu’s opinion, under certain conditions, contradictions may occur in the 
future. therefore, according to Arts. 64(2), 66 and 75(1) of the tFeu (which have 
similar wording to that of Arts. 57(2), 59 and 60(1) of the teu), the Parliament and the 
Council may adopt measures on the movement of capital to or from third countries 
involving direct investment, including investments in real estate, concerning the 
establishment, provision of financial services or the admission of securities to 
capital markets. Bilateral investment agreements, in turn, included provisions on 
the freedom of payment transfers related to investments, without delay and in 
freely convertible currency. According to the CJeu, this constituted potential or 
hypothetical incompatibility with the Founding treaties, despite the fact that the 
Parliament and the Council have never implemented its powers in that sphere.
the Court focused on whether the potential conflicts could be a sufficient ground 
for recognizing the agreements as incompatible with eu law and the Court concluded 
19  Cases C-812/79 Attorney-General v. Burgoa, [1980] e.C.r. 02787; C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal, [2000] e.C.r. 
i-05215; C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal, [2000] e.C.r. i-05171; C-307/99 OFT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft, 
[2001] e.C.r. i-03159; t-2/99 T. Port v. Council, [2001] e.C.r. ii-02093; t-3/99 Banatrading v. Council, [2001] 
e.C.r. ii-02123; C-203/03 Commission v. Austria, [2005] e.C.r. i-00935; C-216/01 Budvar, [2003] e.C.r. 
i-13617; Joined cases C-466, 467, 468, 469, 471, 472, 475 and 476/98 Commission v. UK, Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Austria and Germany (Open skies), [2002] e.C.r. i-09519.
20  See Nikolaos Lavranos, Protecting European Law from International Law, 15(2) european Foreign 
Affairs review 265 (2010); Исполинов А.С., Ануфриева А.А. Право ЕС и международное право: 
последствия нового подхода Суда ЕС к договорам, заключенным государствами-членами 
с третьими странами, 3(34) Евразийский юридический журнал 66 (2011) [Alexey s. ispolinov, 
Alexandra A. Anufrieva, The EU Law and International Law: Consequences of the EU Court’s New Approach 
to Agreements, Concluded by Member States with the Third States, 3(34) eurasian Law Journal 66 (2011)]; 
Allan rosas, The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU Member States, 34(5) 
Fordham international Law Journal 1304 (2011).
21  Case С-205/06 Commission v. Republic of Austria, [2009] e.C.r. i-01301.
22  Case С-249/06 Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden, [2009] e.C.r. i-01335.
23  Case С-118/07 Commission v. Republic of Finland, [2009] e.C.r. i-10889.
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that, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the provisions of Arts. 64(2), 66 and 
75(1) of the tFeu, the Council and Parliament should be able to immediately apply 
the measures that restrict the movement of capital, and investment agreements 
may prevent this. therefore, Art. 351 of the tFeu can be used for the recognition of 
investment agreements as being in conflict with eu law. on the basis of the Court’s 
judgments, three respondent states were found to have violated eu law.24 researchers 
point out that the CJeu received preventive powers to preserve the unity and uniform 
application of eu law. other researchers have reacted negatively to the Court’s 
position, because, in their opinion, it violates the principle of proportionality.25
in any case, Art. 351(2) of the tFeu establishes the obligation of member states 
to take appropriate measures to remove all incompatibilities with the Founding 
treaties in such agreements. Member states shall, where necessary, assist each other 
to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude. Any action can 
be recognized as appropriate provided it eliminates the existing contradictions, 
including the denunciation of international agreements by the member state.
the CJeu indicates that if the member states do not take appropriate steps, 
they lose the opportunity to refer to Art. 351(1) of the tFeu, which states that the 
Founding treaties do not affect their rights and obligations under the agreements 
concluded before those states joined the eu.26
special attention should be paid to the point that, as acts of a constitutional 
nature, the Founding treaties can be only interpreted by the CJeu. this means that 
the existence of other judicial mechanisms established by international agreements 
adopted by the eu cannot influence this monopoly. Moreover, Art. 344 of the tFeu 
is intended to protect this monopoly: 
Member states undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the treaties to any method of settlement 
other than those provided for therein.
this Article was first applied in the MOX Plant case.27 the main issues of the case 
concerned the following. ireland had commenced proceedings against the united 
kingdom in the Arbitral tribunal provided for by the united Nations Convention on 
the Law of the sea to settle a dispute relating to the MoX nuclear fuels reprocessing 
plant at sellafield on the coast of the irish sea. the Court ruled that ireland had 
24  For more detail about the procedure of enforcement actions against member states, see Комарова Т.В. 
Припинення невиконання зобов’язання державами – членами ЄС, 91 Проблеми законності 
173 (2007) [tetyana v. komarova, Cessation of Failure to Fulfill Obligations by the EU Member States, 91 
Problems of Legality 173 (2007)].
25  Lavranos 2010, at 280.
26  Commission v. Austria, supra note 19.
27  Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, [2006] e.C.r. i-04635.
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disregarded its exclusive jurisdiction. ireland breached the treaty by failing to respect 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation 
and application of the Community law provisions. Moreover, the Court held that ireland 
had breached ex-Art. 10 of the treaty by bringing proceedings in the Arbitral tribunal 
without having first informed and consulted the competent Community institutions.
Another example is CJeu opinion 1/0928 on the establishment of the european 
Patent Court, in which the Court noted that an international agreement on the 
appropriate procedure for establishing such court would contradict eu law because 
the newly created court will have jurisdiction to interpret not only the agreement but 
also the provisions of eu law concerning european patents. in addition, the european 
Patent Court could take the power of preliminary references from the member 
states’ national courts and tribunals to the CJeu in matters of patent law, and this 
directly affects the rights of individuals. the CJeu’s preliminary ruling procedure is 
the achievement of the european union and is a system of relations between the 
judicial systems of two levels, which ensures a uniform interpretation and proper 
application of eu law. Changing these relationships can affect the nature of eu law. 
But the Patent Court decision will not be subject to appeal procedures in the CJeu 
and this, in the Court’s opinion, is also a threat to the rights of individuals. therefore, 
the CJeu decided that the Agreement on the establishment of the european Patent 
Court is contrary to the Founding treaties of the eu.
A classic and quite illustrative example of such situation is the long process of 
the accession of the eu to the eChr. in its second opinion 2/13 on eu accession to 
the eChr, the CJeu29 noted that the draft agreement on the accession contradicts 
Art. 344 of the tFeu, since the CJeu has exclusive jurisdiction over any dispute 
between member states and the eu concerning the compliance of the Convention. 
According to the draft agreement, there is a possibility that the eu or member states 
may complain to the eChr concerning the alleged violations of the Convention 
by an eu member state or by the eu. this possibility is completely contrary to the 
provisions of the tFeu in the context of eu law. the project could insert the exclusion 
from the eChr’s jurisdiction of disputes between the member states or between the 
latter and the eu itself concerning the application of the eChr in the context of eu 
law, but these provisions were not included in it.
in addition, the CJeu noted that Protocol 16 of the eChr, signed on 2 october 
2013 (but not yet in force), allows higher courts and tribunals of the member states 
28  opinion 1/09 delivered pursuant to Article 218(11) tFeu – draft agreement – Creation of a unified 
patent litigation system – european and Community Patents Court – Compatibility of the draft 
agreement with the treaties, [2011] e.C.r. i-01137.
29  opinion 2/13 pursuant to Article 218(11) tFeu – draft international agreement – Accession of the 
european union to the european Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms – Compatibility of the draft agreement with the eu and Feu treaties, 18 december 2014 
(Jun. 25, 2017), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62013Cv0002&lang1=en&t
ype=tXt&ancre=.
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to ask the european Court of human rights (hereinafter – eCthr) to provide advisory 
opinions on the fundamental issues relating to the interpretation or exercising the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the eChr and its Protocols. this situation could 
affect the autonomy and efficiency of the CJeu’s preliminary rulings procedure 
in cases when the rights protected by the eu Charter on Fundamental rights 
correspond to the rights provided for by the eChr.
therefore, the signing of the Agreement did not take place because of its 
incompatibility with integrational law, including the dispute settlement procedures. 
it was this opinion that caused the indignation of many researchers.30 their position 
is very tough because of the fact that the CJeu ignored the strengthening of human 
rights and justified this with rather dubious concerns about the autonomy of eu law. 
they accused the Court of “selfish concern” with preserving its own power.31 however, 
it should be noted that it was the uniform interpretation of eu law that allowed the 
eu to achieve its level of development.
the Court’s practice also provides examples of international agreements already 
in force being recognized void when member states or other institutions challenged 
the acts of the institutions that provided consent to them. For example, by the 
decision on joint cases C-317/04, C-318/0432 the CJeu annulled the Council decision 
on the Community’s agreement on the processing and transfer of personal data 
between the Community and the united states because the Community does not 
have competence in that sphere. this violates the redistribution of competence 
between the Community and the member states established in the Founding treaties. 
A similarly well-known case is the “banana decision” regarding the cancellation of 
the results of the uruguay round.33
though cancellation by the eu of the implementation of international 
agreements may look like a violation of international obligations, the CJeu does 
respect international law and the pacta sunt servanda principle. in its decision on 
joint cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, the CJeu pointed out that, in light of the fact 
that international obligations have already arisen for the eu under the international 
agreement and the fact that the eu considers itself a bona fide subject of international 
law, it made the Council decision cease to apply within ninety days of its termination in 
order to avoid serious losses of contractors due to the termination of the agreement. 
the CJeu gave such term to parties to reach a new agreement. or, if a member state 
is a party to a multilateral Convention which is contrary to eu law, the state must 
30  steve Peers, The CJEU and the EU’s Accession to the ECHR: A Clear and Present Danger to Human Rights 
Protection, eu Law Analysis, 18 december 2014 (Jun. 25, 2017), available at http://eulawanalysis.
blogspot.ru/2014/12/the-cjeu-and-eus-accession-to-echr.html.
31  Christoph krenn, Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR Accession after 
Opinion 2/13, 16(1) german Law Journal 147 (2015).
32  Joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v. Council and Parliament v. Commission, [2006] e.C.r. 
i-04721.
33  Case C-122/95 Germany v. Council, [1998] e.C.r. i-00973.
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denounce it in accordance with Art. 351 of the tFeu, but if the Convention provides 
for certain procedures of denunciation or withdrawal (e.g., every 10 years), the state 
must respect and adhere to these procedures.34
All the above cases are related to the collisions between international agreements 
and primary eu law. As for secondary law, the position of the CJeu is univocal – 
the primacy of international law.35 the Court stressed that the principle of good 
faith is a principle of customary international law, the existence of which has been 
repeatedly declared by the uN international Court of Justice and which is codified in 
Art. 18 of the vienna Convention on Law of treaties36 and that is why such principle 
is binding on the eu.
2.2. International Agreements to Which the EU is Not a Party
special attention should be paid to the issues concerning the legal power of 
international agreements to which the eu is not a party. the CJeu demonstrates 
respect to international law in cases where all member states are parties to an 
international agreement but the eu itself is not. in Intertanko et al. v. Secretary of 
State for Transport37 the Court took into account the fact that all member states, 
without exception, are parties to the international Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from ships (MArPoL 73/78), and this Convention is also mentioned in 
the eu directive on pollution from ships. that is why the CJeu decided to use the 
Convention for the interpretation of eu law in its light. two principles formed the 
legal basis of such use: a general principle of good faith and the principle of sincere 
cooperation, indicated in Art. 4(3) of the teu: 
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the european union and 
the Member states shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying 
out tasks which flow from the treaties. 
therefore, the CJeu used the provisions of MArPoL 73/78 in its interpretation of 
the eu directive. this should not be confused with giving direct effect to the rules 
of MArPoL 73/78 because the Court specifically only referred to “the opportunity 
to take it into consideration.”
the CJeu has treated the possibility of using international agreements to which 
the eu is not a party with care and applies them only when all member states are 
parties to the agreement. Let us take, for example, at the decision in Commune 
34  Commission v. Austria, supra note 19.
35  Cases C-61/94 Commission v. Germany, [1996] e.C.r. i-03989; C-311/04 Algemene Scheeps Agentuur 
Dordreht BV v. Inspecteur der Belastingdienst, [2006] e.C.r. i-00609; C-344/04 The Queen ex parte IATA 
and ELFAA v. Department of Transport, [2006] e.C.r. i-00403.
36  Case t-115/94 Opel Austria v. Council, [1997] e.C.r. ii-00039, paras. 90, 91.
37  Case C-308/06 Intertanko et al. v. Secretary of State for Transport, [2009] e.C.r. i-04057.
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de Mesquer v. Total France SA and Total International Ltd.,38 which concerned the 
interpretation of the Community directive on waste. in this case, an incident with 
a tanker resulted in an oil spill which caused the pollution of the coast of France. the 
question arose regarding the use of the international Convention on Civil Liability 
for oil Pollution damage, to which the majority of the eu member states, but not 
the european union itself, are parties. the Court did not use the provisions of the 
Convention because the Convention is not binding on all member states and, 
therefore, logically its use would violate the principle of good faith. in addition, the 
Community directive on waste does not mention this international source, so it 
does not enter into the legal system of the eu.
returning to the aforementioned possibility of giving direct effect to the norms of 
international agreements, the Court’s practice in this regard is also interesting in the 
light of our research topic. however, such practice applies to agreements concluded 
directly by the eu. in eu law, this issue is of particular importance because individuals 
are its direct actors. the decisive case regarding this issue was Meryem Demirel v. 
Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd,39 where the Court ruled that the provisions of international 
agreements concluded by the Community can have a direct effect.
the process of drafting an agreement, its nature and purpose should be taken 
into account. the direct effect of such an agreement may be present if it includes 
clear and specific obligations which do not require additional approval decisions 
or additional measures to be taken for its implementation.40 so the criteria for the 
direct effect of international agreement norms are similar to those that apply to eu 
law. the rules must be clear, precise and unconditional. therefore, the Court ruled 
that the rules of the Convention on the Law of the sea had not passed this test, and 
that, therefore, they cannot have a direct effect on the legal order of the eu.41 having 
analyzed the Convention provisions, the Court concluded that individuals can be 
granted some rights on its basis only after specific steps made by the member states. 
For example, individuals can take advantage of the freedom of navigation, but only 
if their ship is flying the flag of a state. it is the state that establishes the conditions 
for granting its nationality to ships, for their entry into its register of ships and for 
flying its flag. this intermediate link, based on the national legislation of individual 
states, excludes the existence of a direct effect of the Convention norms.
under these criteria, it is clear that it is more difficult to speak about the direct 
effect of international customary law than that of international agreements, since 
the former is often less specific than agreements. that is why it is very difficult to 
imagine individuals’ direct application of international customary law.
38  Case C-188/07 Commune de Mesquer v. Total France SA and Total International Ltd., [2008] e.C.r. 
i-04501.
39  Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, [1987] e.C.r. i-03719.
40  Id.
41  Intertanko et al. v. Secretary of State for Transport, supra note 37.
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it is worth mentioning some situations where the Founding treaties contain 
a reference to other international agreements to which the eu is not a party. Art. 52(3) 
of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the eu (hereinafter – Charter) states:
in so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to the rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of human rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the 
same as those laid down by the said Convention.
indeed, in the late 1960s, the Court of Justice underlined that the protection of 
fundamental human rights is a constant concern of the Communities. since then, the 
Court has repeatedly referred to the eChr, stressing that it is of particular importance 
in determining the general principles of eu human rights law.42 since the 1990s, 
when it can be confidently said that the Communities got engaged not in purely 
economic issues but started effectively dealing with human rights, the Court began 
using the practice of the eCthr. the Founding treaties show that the eChr is the 
document that inspired the eu’s concern for human rights. Art. 6(3) of the teu states 
that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the eChr, and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the member states, shall constitute the general 
principles of the european union’s law. 
this does not mean that direct effect is given to eChr norms, because Art. 52(3) 
of the Charter establishes the possibility of the european union providing more 
extensive protection of rights than the eChr does. incidentally, according to the 
research, the CJeu’s interpretation of rights and freedoms sometimes differs from 
that of the eCthr. the areas in which these divergences can be seen are: the Common 
european Asylum system based on the dublin regulation; eu practice in using the 
european arrest warrant, which is claimed as significantly divergent from the standard 
eCthr practice on the application of Arts. 3 and 6 of the eChr, and eu anti-monopoly 
practice, with its extremely high fines and the sometimes unjustified extensive powers 
of the european Commission to investigate violations and impose of fines.43
Art. 78(1) of the tFeu provides that a common policy on asylum must comply 
with the 1951 geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 
Protocol and other agreements in this area. Accordingly, the eu Qualification directive 
(directive 2011/95/eu), which creates a single system for asylum in member states, 
specifies and develops the provisions of the aforementioned international acts. in 
42  Cases 29/69 Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm – Sozialamt, [1969] e.C.r. 00419; 11/70 Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, [1970] e.C.r. 
01125.
43  Исполинов А.С. Практика ЕСПЧ в отношении Европейского Союза: некоторые уроки для ЕврАзЭС, 
3 Журнал зарубежного законодательства и сравнительного правоведения 108, 112–114 (2012) 
[Alexey s. ispolinov, The ECtHR Practice Concerning the European Union: Some Lessons for EurAsEC, 3 
Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law 108, 112–114 (2012)].
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several cases, when interpreting the Qualification directive, the CJeu referred directly 
to the 1951 geneva Convention interpreting eu Law on the basis thereof.44
it should be noted that the CJeu pointed out that the guidelines which should 
be used to determine fundamental rights as general principles of eu law can be 
found in international agreements on human rights, which have been signed by the 
member states.45 Accordingly, the CJeu used the universal declaration of human 
rights of 1948, the european social Charter of 1961,46 the international Covenant 
on economic, social and Cultural rights of 1966, the international Covenant on Civil 
and Political rights of 1966, the Convention on the rights of Child of 1989 and so 
on.47 the Founding treaties stress the strict compliance with the principles of the 
uN Charter several times (Arts. 3(5) and 21 of the teu).
2.3. International Customary Law
the application of customary law, which is one of the most important parts of 
international law, has always had a lot of nuances. eu law is not an exception in this 
regard. Based on the case law of the CJeu, it is clear that, in the eu, member states’ 
relations the norms of international customary law are displaced by the norms of 
the Founding treaties, particularly in the areas of the eu’s exclusive competence, 
which is precisely regulated at the eu level. Pieter Jan kuijper gives a good example 
of the impossibility of using classical international legal remedies for the breach of 
international agreements, such as unilateral sanctions in the form of suspension of 
other agreement obligations or other countermeasures, since the eu has its own 
perfect mechanism. this is a judicial procedure of enforcement actions against member 
states based on Arts. 258–260 of the tFeu, which is comprehensive and effective. 
regarding the eu’s relations with countries outside the eu, the CJeu often uses 
customary international law. For example, the Court uses customary rules for the 
interpretation of international agreements listed in Arts. 31–33 of the vienna Convention 
on the Law of treaties of 1969.48 A classic example of use of customary international 
law by the CJeu is its judgment in Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation 
Corporation49 concerning the prohibition on salmon fishing in the North Atlantic high 
44  Joined cases C-175-179/08 Salahadin Abdulla and Others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [2010] 
e.C.r. i-01493; Case C-31/09 Nawras Bolbol. v. Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal, [2010] e.C.r. 
i-05539.
45  Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission, [1974] e.C.r. 00491.
46  Cases C-540/03 Parliament v. Council, [2006] e.C.r. i-5769; C-438/05 Viking, [2007] e.C.r. i-10779.
47  Concerning the binding force of international agreements on human rights to the eu, see israel de 
Jesus Butler & olivier de schutter, Binding the EU to International Human Rights Law, 27 yearbook of 
european Law 277, 293–298 (2009).
48  Case C-386/08 Brita v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, [2010] eCr i-01289. See also Pieter Jan kuijper, 
The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 25(1) Legal 
issues of european integration 1 (1998).
49  Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corporation, [1992] e.C.r. i-06019.
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seas. the Court relied on the norm of custom contained in the geneva Conventions 
on the high seas of 1958 and the uN Convention on the Law of the sea of 1982 on 
the nationality of the ship, its crew and about various marine zones.
when postponing the entry into force of the Agreement on Cooperation with 
yugoslavia, which contradicted the terms provided in the Agreement, the CJeu 
referred to the customary rule that allows such actions in case of a substantial 
change of circumstances, namely, the civil war in the country.50 this customary rule 
of international law was mentioned earlier in the Judgment of the international 
Court of Justice in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros.51
therefore, though the CJeu is not officially bound by the agreements to which 
eu is not a party, it is bound by customary international law and that is why such 
international agreements (of general codification) are an important proof of the 
existence such customary rules.
in CJeu practice, we cannot find the use of customary law norms that had not been 
codified or confirmed by the decisions of other courts. in this respect, scholars rightly 
point out that the Court has positioned itself as a “modern” entity that seeks evidence 
of existence of customs exclusively in declarations or conventions which have not yet 
come into force, as opposed to adopting a traditional approach based on the search 
of international custom in the durable state practice and the opinio juris.
3. The Kadi Case as a Symptom  
of the Contemporary Autonomy of EU Law
in the context of the problems under consideration, the correlation of the eu legal 
order with international law, especially with that of the united Nations (hereinafter – 
uN), seems to be of special importance. the CJeu raised this issue in Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities52 
(hereinafter – Kadi), a case which is quite different from the Court’s regular practice. 
this is a high-profile case that demonstrate the CJeu’s position on the hierarchy of, 
and the relationship between, eu law and international law.
the issue of the hierarchy of eu and uN law has not been sufficiently researched 
because the subjects of these two systems are quite different. usually, individuals 
are outside the uN’s scope of interests and actions because it focuses mainly on the 
classical subjects of international law, i.e., states, unlike the eu, which has proclaimed 
itself a union of european peoples functioning for the eu citizens. the uN has only 
started directing its law at individuals in recent years, and this is carried out indirectly 
through states. we are talking about anti-terrorist actions and the uN security 
Council sanctions mechanism against individuals.
50  Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, [1998] e.C.r. i-03655.
51  Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, i.C.J. rep. 1997, p. 7.
52  Case t-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, [2005] e.C.r. ii-03649.
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the Kadi decision was significant not only for understanding of the relationship 
between eu law and the uN law, but it also caused a huge amount of doctrinal 
debates. the judgment resulted a huge number of emotive debates comparable to 
very few preceding CJeu decisions. the main issues of this case are as follows: a citizen 
of saudi Arabia, yassin Abdullah kadi, who had very significant business interests in 
the eu, brought a direct action to the Court of the First instance (hereinafter – CFi) 
to annul Council regulation eC 2580/2001,53 which concerned persons suspected of 
supporting terrorism. the Annex to this regulation contained a list of persons and 
organizations suspected of supporting terrorism and among them there was yassin 
Abdullah kadi. the aim of the regulation was to freeze, in the eu, all funds of the 
persons listed in the Annex. the regulation was adopted for the implementation of 
several uN security Council resolutions concerning the fight against terrorism which 
were adopted on the basis of Part vii of the uN Charter.54 the resolutions required all 
uN member states to take appropriate steps to freeze the accounts and assets of the 
individuals and organizations that, according to the opinion of the uN Committee 
on sanctions, had links with osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the taliban. 
the list of such persons and organizations was prepared by the uN Committee on 
sanctions in 2001 and was expanded several times. Later, the uN security Council 
resolution allowed some softening on the freezing of funds of suspected persons 
and allowed such funds to be used for humanitarian purposes with the consent of 
the uN Committee on sanctions. the eu, in turn, also changed the Council regulation 
in accordance with the uN resolution’s additions and allowed the suspected persons 
to use the funds for food, for medical purposes and for the payment of taxes.
in his CFi action, the plaintiff, yassin Abdullah kadi, insisted that he was the victim of 
a serious breach of justice because he had never supported terrorist activities, and thus 
his name was unreasonably entered into the list. he referred to the fact that the council 
regulation violated his fundamental rights such as the right to property guaranteed 
by Art. 1 of Protocol 1 of the eChr, the right to a fair trial under Art. 6 of the eChr and 
the right to a fair hearing which is established by the practice of the CJeu.
the plaintiff explained his position that, first, he had not been notified about being 
listed as a person suspected of terrorism, and, therefore, he was unable to conduct his 
defense. second, there were no grounds in the regulation for including the plaintiff in 
this list and this fact also affects the efficiency of judicial protection since the plaintiff 
could not effectively defend himself without clearly understanding the grounds of the 
accusation. the plaintiff relied on the practice of the CJeu which stated that fundamental 
53  regulation (eC) No. 2580/2001 on specific restrictive Measures directed against Certain Persons and 
entities with a view to Combating terrorism, oJ L 344, 28 december 2001, p. 70.
54  s.C. res. 1390 (2002) of 16 January 2002 (Jun. 25, 2017), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/1390(2002); s.C. res. 1267 (1999) of 15 october 1999 (Jun. 25, 2017), 
available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/1267%281999%29; s.C. res. 
1333 (2000) of 19 december 2000 (Jun. 25, 2017), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=s/res/1333(2000).
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rights recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of the member states, especially 
those enshrined in the eChr, form an integral part of the legal order of the eu.
in its judgment, the CFi noted that, under customary international law and Art. 103 
of the uN Charter, the obligations of member states under the uN Charter must prevail 
over all other obligations or national law, or international law, or eu law.55 the obligations 
under the uN Charter include the obligations imposed by the binding acts of the 
security Council. the CFi said that the eu had complied with such obligations, even 
despite the fact that it is not directly bound by the uN Charter provisions, because the 
eu is not a party thereto. the CFi underlined that the eu is not only forbidden to violate 
the obligations under the uN Charter, but also has a duty to do its best to facilitate 
the implementation of these commitments by its member states. therefore, the CFi 
completely denied the plaintiff’s argument that the eu legal order is independent of 
the uN legal order and governed by its own rules of law, and it emphasized the duty 
of the eu to obey the uN Charter norms, which set standards for its member states. 
the CFi added that, under international law and eu law, it would be unfair to verify 
the binding acts of the security Council on their compliance with the human rights 
standards recognized by the eu. therefore, the review of the uN security Council 
resolution, even indirectly, is unacceptable on the part of the eu judicial authorities.
it would seem that the CFi’s decision is fully consistent with the unitary concept of 
international law and the classical idea about the eu. But the CFi added that, in spite 
of the above, it has the power to review security Council resolutions for compliance 
with jus cogens. this change in the CFi’s argument was unexpected. indeed, the 
norms of jus cogens are binding on all subjects of international law, including the 
uN security Council. As Peter hilpold appropriately notes, norms of jus cogens in 
relation to uN activities have a dual purpose: they extend the powers of the security 
Council, since they are related to the needs of guaranteeing peace and security, but 
they also serve as the limit beyond which the security Council cannot go to avoid an 
ultra vires act.56 this argument is contained in a separate opinion of ad hoc Judge of 
the uN international Court of Justice, elihu Lauterpacht, in the case concerning the 
application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
genocide, who emphasized that the concept of jus cogens is higher than customary 
international law and treaties. Art. 103 of the uN Charter (which provides that, in 
the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the uN under 
the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the Charter shall prevail) cannot be applied in case of contradiction 
of security Council resolutions with the norms of jus cogens.57
55  Kadi, supra note 52.
56  Peter hilpold, EU Law and UN Law in Conflict: The Kadi Case, 13 Max Planck yearbook of united Nations 
Law 141, 171 (2009).
57  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 8 April 1993, Provisional Measures, separate 
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, i.C.J. rep. 1993, p. 440, para. 100.
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the question is whether the judicial authority of another international 
organization can verify the legitimacy of the decisions of the security Council and 
precisely this question seems very controversial. the CFi has concluded that it is 
empowered with such competence. in addition, the CFi noted that the right to 
property is the norm of jus cogens. By definition, jus cogens are peremptory principles 
or norms from which no derogation or limitation are permitted. however, the right to 
property and the right to a fair trial mentioned by the plaintiff do not enjoy absolute 
protection. in themselves, they are not absolute. in the interests of the society, and 
especially of the international community, they may be limited, so it is impossible 
to qualify them as jus cogens. some member states, France, the Netherlands and the 
united kingdom among them, objected to such qualification in the CFi’s decision. 
Moreover, it became a ground for scientific criticism.58
having analyzed the resolution, the CFi concluded that, since the uN security 
Council resolution provided humanitarian exceptions and the states could appeal 
the resolution to the Committee on sanctions, the freezing of kadi’s funds did 
not constitute a violation of jus cogens. similarly, the CFi found no violation of the 
right to a fair hearing and the right to a fair trial under jus cogens. therefore, it can 
be concluded that the main provisions of the CFi’s decision are as follows: 1) the 
CFi denied the dualist concept concerning the eu’s position in the international 
legal order and categorically subjected the eu to the uN decisions; 2) despite such 
subordination, the CFi reserved for itself a possibility to review the security Council’s 
acts on their compliance with the peremptory norms of international law, not just the 
norms on the protection of human rights recognized by the eu; 3) the CFi defined the 
position of the eu as a subordinated to the uN, but with its own control mechanisms 
that will be implemented on behalf of the international community.
the CFi decision was appealed by the plaintiff to the european Court of Justice 
(predecessor of the CJeu; hereinafter – eCJ) and, as a result, it was canceled on the 
ground that the Council regulation significantly limited the fundamental rights of the 
plaintiff and the regulation was annulled. the Court noted that it annulled the relevant 
eu rules, but extends their action for the following three months to provide time for the 
Council to adopt a new act and appropriate legal mechanisms for its implementation.
the analysis of Kadi confirms that it is fully consistent with the concept which 
the Court formulated concerning the uniqueness and autonomy of the eu legal 
order. this concept established the eu as a supranational, integrative organization 
that is significantly different from classical intergovernmental organizations. thus, 
the Court continued the development of the dualistic model of the relationship 
between international and eu law. the Court had been developing the constitutional 
characteristics of the Founding treaties for too long to deny it in one decision. the 
Advocate general Poiares Maduro, appointed in this case, also emphasized the idea 
58  Piet eeckhout, Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights, and UN Security Council Resolutions: 
In Search of the Right Fit, 3(2) european Constitutional Law review 183 (2007); Christian tomuschat, 
Case Note on Kadi v. Council, 43(2) Common Market Law review 537 (2005).
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that provisions of international agreements cannot restrict the constitutional principles 
of the Founding treaties. And actually, this decision stressed that the Founding treaties’ 
provisions shall have primacy over the norms of international law because of the eu’s 
uniqueness. in addition, the Court stated that it did not cancel or review the norms of 
the security Council resolution or of the uN Charter, but the internal eu regulation, 
which implemented the resolution, i.e., the Council regulation. the Court stressed 
that international agreements cannot affect the distribution of powers provided 
by the Founding treaties, or the autonomy of the eu’s legal system. therefore, the 
obligations imposed by international agreements cannot be more important than 
the eu’s constitutional principles. At the same time, the Court found that eu law 
must respect international law and all eu measures must be interpreted in the light 
of international law and particular attention should be paid to the application of uN 
resolutions based on Chapter vii of the uN Charter. But this does not affect the status 
of international law – it remains a parallel system that cannot change the power and 
primacy of the fundamental eu law principles. therefore, the Court stated that, even 
if the rules established by the security Council resolution could be classified as part of 
eu law, their position would be higher than secondary eu law, but lower than general 
principles of the Founding treaties and eu law, which include fundamental rights.
the position of the Court in Kadi was criticized by scientists. Moreover, the Court 
was accused of doing injustice to international law59 and even of the revival of the 
idea of nationalism.60 grainne de Burca, while analyzing the decision, concluded 
that, by adopting this very decision, the Court “proclaimed the primacy of its internal 
constitutional values over the norms of international law” and adopted “a strongly 
pluralist approach which emphasized the internal and external autonomy and 
separateness of the eC’s legal order from the international domain.”61 he suggested 
that instead of seeking compromise and doctrinally building a hierarchy between 
the sources of international and eu law, the Court demonstrated to all subjects that 
international law can be conquered by the constitutional principles of eu law.
But other authors supported the Court’s position which was based on the primacy 
of the principles of protection of human rights.62 some researchers have pointed 
out that the Court was forced to take this decision because the uN’s human rights 
protection mechanisms are far from perfect.63
59  grainne de Burca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi, 51(1) 
harvard international Law Journal 1, 44 (2010).
60  Christian tomuschat, The Kadi Case: What Relationship is there between the Universal Legal Order under 
the Auspices of the United Nations and the EU Legal Order?, 28(1) yearbook of european Law 654, 658, 
663 (2009).
61  de Burca 2010, at 49.
62  Juliane kokott & Christoph sobotta, The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – 
Finding the Balance?, 23(4) european Journal of international Law 1015 (2012).
63  Martin scheinin, Is the ECJ Ruling in Kadi Incompatible with International Law?, 28(1) yearbook of 
european Law 637 (2009).
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the situation with Kadi is very similar to the one which the european Community 
(hereinafter – eC) faced in the 1970s when the german Federal Constitutional 
Court questioned the supremacy of eC law because it did not establish the proper 
level of human rights protection which is required in legitimate and democratic 
constitutional systems. A comparison of the human rights system of the eC and 
germany demonstrated the weakness of the former (like the weakness of the uN 
mechanisms compared to the eu mechanisms in Kadi). then the german Federal 
Constitutional Court took the well-known decision in Solange I,64 according to which 
germany could review the Community acts on their compliance with national 
standards of human rights. only in 1984, the decision in Solange II65 concluded that 
the level of human rights protection in the Community had reached an adequate 
level, so the need for reviewing control no longer existed.
in 1998 the eCthr declared the existence of a developed mechanism for human 
rights protection in the eu. this was in Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland,66 the circumstances 
of which were as follows: Bosphorus turkish Airlines rented an aircraft, which belonged 
to the republic of yugoslavia, and transferred it to ireland. irish authorities confiscated 
the plane on the basis of regulation 990/93, which implemented sanctions against 
yugoslavia. Bosphorus Airlines challenged the confiscation of the aircraft at the Court 
of Justice on the ground of a violation of the right to property, but the Court rejected 
the application. then the airline addressed a complaint to the eCthr that, in its decision, 
adopted the concept of “equivalent protection” – the presumption that the eu has 
high standards of human rights. without having the competence to review eu acts, 
the eCthr made a presumption that they met the eChr standards. this presumption 
holds good until evidence of any control mechanism dysfunctions or shortcomings 
in the protection of human rights emerge. incidentally, the eCthr focused on the fact 
that all eu institutions observe the general principles of Community law, which also 
include the provisions of the eChr.67
it is important to remember that, in Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati 
v. France, Germany and Norway,68 the eCthr did not extend the equivalent protection 
doctrine to the uN legal order but, at the same time, recognized the lack of jurisdiction 
to review the acts of the security Council on their compliance with the eChr. the 
eCthr, unlike the CJeu, did not engage in an open legal conflict with the uN.
64  Bverfge 37, 271 [1974] (Solange I).
65  Bverfge 73, 339 [1986] (Solange II).
66  Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland, no. 45036/98, 30 June 2005, ECHR 2005-VI.
67  in this regard, i would like to recall the opinion of the Advocate general walter Van gerven in S.P.U.C. 
v. Grogan, where he said that despite the fact that precedential practice does not give direct effect to 
international agreements in the Community’s legal order, some international agreements, together with 
constitutional traditions common to all Member states, help to define the general principles of Community 
law (Case C-159/90 S.P.U.C. v. Grogan, [1991] e.C.r. i-04685, Ag van gerven’s opinion, para. 30).
68  Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, nos. 71412/01 and 
78166/01, 2 May 2007, [2007] 45 ehrr se10.
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the security Council took into account the eCJ’s position and adopted a new 
resolution69 which took into consideration the gaps in human rights standards the 
Court had pointed out. the security Council found that the lists of persons and 
organizations suspected of terrorism should be openly published in every state and 
each person or organization on the lists should be informed personally about it. this 
indirectly supported the eCJ’s position in Kadi. Moreover, the resolution bound the uN 
Committee on sanctions to argue its suspicions on the involvement of individuals and 
organizations in terrorist activities. in 2010, within the uN Committee on sanctions 
an independent institution of ombudsperson was introduced.70 the ombudsperson 
is empowered to examine requests from individuals, groups, businesses or entities 
seeking to be removed from the security Council’s isiL and Al-Qaida sanction list.71 
since that time, the ombudsperson has gained considerable political influence, 
despite the fact that his/her reports have no binding power. A considerable amount 
of the ombudsperson’s procedural rules were borrowed from the eCJ decision in 
Kadi. At present, 70 cases initiated by the ombudsperson have been completed and 
8 more delisting requests are being considered by the ombudsperson.72
it should also be emphasized that there have been no political statements or 
positions on the part of the uN, which would prove the protest against the Court’s 
position. Moreover, the individual sanctions regime has been constantly criticized for 
violations of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial,73 etc., because 
even the uN Committee on sanctions’ meetings were closed. it could be concluded 
that the eCJ decision contributed to the improvement of the uN mechanisms. 
therefore, the commitment of the eCJ to human rights issues has made an impact 
on international law and uN decision-making activities.
in this regard, grainne de Burca rightly pointed out that the challenges 
encountered in Kadi are indicators of the growing complexity of the international 
legal environment.74,75 indeed, it is quite difficult to talk about the prevalence of the 
69  s.C. res. 1822 (2008) of 30 June 2008 (Jun. 25, 2017), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/uNdoC/geN/N08/404/90/PdF/N0840490.pdf?openelement.
70  s.C. res. 1904 (2009) of 17 december 2009 and its Annex ii (Jun. 25, 2017), available at http://www.
un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/1904%20%282009%29.
71  Concerning legal analysis of this institution, see Adele J. kirschner, Security Council Resolution 1904 
(2009): A Significant Step in the Evolution of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Regime?, 70 Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches recht und völkerrecht 585 (2010).
72  After the reforms, in 2008 the Committee on sanctions gave yassin Abdullah kadi the opportunity to 
present his comments on the accusation. After researching his comments, the Committee concluded 
that it has reason to include yassin Abdullah kadi in the list of suspected persons.
73  enzo Cannizzaro, A Machiavellian Moment? The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law, 3(2) international 
organizations Law review 189 (2006); Jessica Almquist, A Human Rights Critique of European Judicial 
Review: Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, 57(2) international and Comparative Law Quarterly 303 (2008).
74  de Burca 2010, at 8.
75  the uN also drew the attention on this. in this regard, in 2002 the international Law Commission 
established the study group on researching the fragmentation of international law and, in 2006, as 
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constitutional approach concerning international law, which coincides with the 
monistic approach.76 with the emergence of powerful integrative players in the 
international arena, the eu being one of the most successful ones, we cannot talk 
about the homogeneity of international law and the existence of a uniform world 
system with unified standards of legal relations. on the contrary, there is a regional 
constitutionalization, for example, within the eu, with its own principles of primacy 
in its unique legal system – sui generis.77
the CJeu upheld the pluralistic concept of international legal order, distinguishing 
the eu and the international law systems with their own hierarchies of norms. the 
Court offered a world regime model with horizontal, non-hierarchical, separate 
orders. the eu competence does not extend to review the rules of the parallel order, 
but may concern its own legal acts that implement those rules. By its decision in Kadi, 
the Court continued its systemic work to establish the concept of the autonomous eu 
legal order. the Court has shown itself as guarantor of the eu constitutional system 
and it could not help provoking a strong reaction on the part of international law 
researchers who accused the Court of a selective attitude to international norms 
and of giving preference to eu values.
the said eu constitutional values are the cornerstone of the eu constitutional 
system which actually originate in international law and can never be deviated from. 
in this regard, i would like to note that the concept of “general principles of eu law,” 
which, since the Lisbon treaty came into force, have been called “common values 
of eu law,” is a concept which has entirely been developed by the CJeu. it includes 
a rather wide range of rules which are common to the constitutional traditions of all 
member states, international agreements on human rights and the eChr. the Court 
has always put this category of rules on the top of the legal norms hierarchy. the 
CJeu claims that the aim of the eu is to protect the value of its own constitutional 
order including european standards of human rights, regardless of whether it results 
in an indirect refusal to follow the security Council instructions. the essential thing 
here is that, in identifying the source of human rights, the Court does not rely on 
a result of its work, it presented to the general Assembly the report “Fragmentation of international 
Law: difficulties Arising from the diversification and expansion of international Law” (Jun. 25, 2017), 
available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf.
76  See erica de wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55(1) international and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 51 (2006); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community, 36(3) Columbia Journal of transnational Law 529 (1998); Anne Peters, Compensatory 
Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19(3) 
Leiden Journal of international Law 579 (2006); Bruno simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest 
in International Law, 250 Collected Courses of the hague Academy of international Law 217 (1994); 
Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comments on a Proposal from Germany, 
47(1) harvard international Law Journal 223 (2006).
77  See Комарова Т. Влияние Суда ЕС на конституционализацию права Европейского Союза, 3 Право 
Украины 64 (2013) [tetyana komarova, The Influence of the CJEU on Constitutionalization of the European 
Union Law, 3 Law of ukraine 64 (2013)].
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the internal rules of the eu, but on the international Bill of rights, which is binding 
on all parties, including the uN security Council.
Conclusion
the international legal order is in the process of constant evolution, but its current 
status indicates its fragmentation and lack of homogeneity. it is impossible to talk 
about the existence of a supreme legal order and secondary ones. therefore, the 
eu legal order, which started its development as a purely highly specialized one, 
cannot, for example, currently be viewed as subordinated to the uN. this legal order 
has developed its own principles which, though they respect the basic principles of 
general international law, have their own specific character.
the CJeu continues its systemic work on strengthening the autonomy of the 
eu legal order. the Court’s case law shows that the eu will not deviate from their 
constitutional principles such as the principles of eu law supremacy and respect for 
human rights. At the same time, we should pay tribute to the eu for its great respect 
towards general international law. the CJeu indicates the place of international law in 
the hierarchy of sources of eu law – in all cases it is lower than the Founding treaties 
because, otherwise, the eu would be deprived of its indispensable autonomy.
the decisions in Kadi open a new era in relations between eu law and international 
law because these decisions repeat the dogma of respect for international law 
provided there are no violations of the general principles of eu law, including respect 
for human rights, which transforms the eu from a union of states into a union of 
peoples and citizens.
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